Rand Study Suggests U.S. Loses War With China
By wendell minnick
Published: 16 Oct 11:45 EDT (15:45 GMT)
TAIPEI - A new RAND study suggests U.S. air power in the Pacific
would be inadequate to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2020. The
study, entitled "Air Combat Past, Present and Future," by John
Stillion and Scott Perdue, says China's anti-access arms and strategy
could deny the U.S. the "ability to operate efficiently from nearby
bases or seas."
According to the study, U.S. aircraft carriers and air bases would be
threatened by Chinese development of anti-ship ballistic missiles,
the fielding of diesel and nuclear submarines equipped with torpedoes
and SS-N-22 and SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fighters
and bombers carrying ASCMs and HARMs, and new ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles.
The report states that 34 missiles with submunition warheads could
cover all parking ramps at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa.
An "attack like this could damage, destroy or strand 75 percent of
aircraft based at Kadena," it says.
In contrast, many Chinese air bases are harder than Kadena, with some
"super-hard underground hangers."
To make matters worse, Kadena is the only U.S. air base within 500
nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, whereas China has 27.
U.S. air bases in South Korea are more than 750 miles distant, and
those in Japan are more than 885 miles away. Anderson Air Force Base,
Guam, is 1,500 miles away. The result is that sortie rates will be
low, with a "huge tanker demand."
The authors suggest China's CETC Y-27 radar, which is similar to
Russia's Nebo SVU VHF Digital AESA, could counter U.S. stealth
fighter technology. China is likely to outfit its fighters with
improved radars and by "2020 even very stealthy targets likely [would
be] detectable by Flanker radars at 25+ nm." China is also likely to
procure the new Su-35BM fighter by 2020, which will challenge the F-
35 and possibly the F-22.
The authors also question the reliability of U.S. beyond-visual-range
weapons, such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. U.S. fighters have recorded only
10 AIM-120 kills, none against targets equipped with the kinds of
countermeasures carried by Chinese Su-27s and Su-30s. Of the 10, six
were beyond-visual-range kills, and it required 13 missiles to get
them.
If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, the
authors say it is difficult to "predict who will have had the last
move in the measure-countermeasure game."
Overall, the authors say, "China could enjoy a 3:1 edge in fighters
if we can fly from Kadena - about 10:1 if forced to operate from
Andersen. Overcoming these odds requires qualitative superiority of
9:1 or 100:1" - a differential that is "extremely difficult to
achieve" against a like power.
If beyond-visual-range missiles work, stealth technology is not
countered and air bases are not destroyed, U.S. forces have a chance,
but "history suggests there is a limit of about 3:1 where quality can
no longer compensate for superior enemy numbers."
A 24-aircraft Su-27/30 regiment can carry around 300 air-to-air
missiles (AAMs), whereas 24 F-22s can carry only 192 AAMs and 24 F-
35s only 96 AAMs.
Though current numbers assume the F-22 could shoot down 48 Chinese
Flankers when "outnumbered 12:1 without loss," these numbers do not
take into account a less-than-perfect U.S. beyond-visual-range
performance, partial or complete destruction of U.S. air bases and
aircraft carriers, possible deployment of a new Chinese stealth
fighter around 2020 or 2025, and the possible use of Chinese "robo-
fighters" to deplete U.S. "fighters' missile loadout prior to mass
attack."
The authors write that Chinese counter stealth, anti-access,
countermissile technologies are proliferating and the U.S. military
needs "a plan that accounts for this."
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